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THE PARTISAN OF NONPARTISANSHIP:
JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE LAW OF

DEMOCRACY
PamelaS. Karlan*
At the turn of the last century, the fictional Chicago bartender Mr.
Dooley uttered perhaps the most widely quoted remark ever made about the
relationship between constitutional adjudication and politics. In the course
of a conversation with his friend Hennessey about the Insular Cases-a
series of decisions concerning the application of the Constitution to
territories the United States had annexed or occupied after the Spanish-

American Warl-Mr. Dooley observed,
"An' there ye have th' decision, Hinnissy, that's shaken th' intellicts iv
th' nation to their very foundations, or will if they thry to read it ...
Some say it laves th' flag up in th' air an' some say that's where it laves
th' constitution. Annyhow, something's in th' air. But there's wan thing
I'm sure about."
"What's that?" asked Mr. Hennessy.
"That is," said Mr. Dooley, "no matther whether th' constitution
2
follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns."

A century later, Rasul v. Bush 3 shows that it still matters whether the
4
Constitution applies to the part of Cuba we occupy. And in Bush v. Gore,
we saw Mr. Dooley's aphorism turned on its head: This time, the election
returns followed the Supreme Court.
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School.
Co-Director, Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic. I thank Tommy
Goldstein and Viola Canales for helpful suggestions.
1. The Supreme Court later explained that the Insular Cases stood for the proposition
that "not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even where the
United States has sovereign power." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268
(1990); see, e.g., Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 119, 123 (1901) (holding that despite U.S.
military occupation, Cuba remained a foreign country that "cannot be regarded, in any
constitutional, legal or international sense, a part of the territory of the United States" and
therefore that the appellant could be extradited to Cuba and tried there without receiving
U.S. constitutional protections).
2. Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions 26 (1901). The particular case Mr.
Dooley was trying to explain was Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), which concerned
the question whether Article I permitted the government to impose tariffs on goods entering
the United States from Puerto Rico.
3. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

2187

2188

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

In recent years, the relationship between elections and politics seems to
have been turned on its head more generally. Rather than elections
determining who will govern, the government determines who will be
elected. The relationship among the voters, the government, and the courts
has become increasingly complicated. On a variety of issues, Alexander
Bickel's counter-majoritarian
difficulty 5 and John Hart Ely's
representation-reinforcing judicial review 6 have fought each other to a
stalemate. Should courts defer to or distrust campaign finance legislation?
Do initiatives imposing term limits promote democracy or undermine it?
As for the Reapportionment Revolution, was Robert Frost right that "[t]he
trouble with a total revolution... [i]s that it brings the same class up on
top"? 7 While Justice John Paul Stevens has insisted that it is not the
Supreme Court's "constitutional function to choose between the competing
visions of what makes democracy work,"'8 every Justice must make that
choice unless he or she is prepared to declare questions about politics to be
nonjusticiable political questions, a stance that Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes long ago termed "little more than a play upon words." 9 Last Term,
for example, in Clingman v. Beaver,10 the Court upheld Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system, which permits only party members and
independents to vote in a party's primary. The majority credited the state's
policy with advancing a number of "important" democracy-enhancing
interests-in particular, preserving the identifiability of political parties and
the ideological cue that party nomination provides to voters in the general
election.1 1 By contrast, Justice Stevens's dissent argued that rather than
enhancing democracy, Oklahoma's law impaired it, insulating the major
parties from competition and exacerbating the pathologies of safe
districting. 12 The previous Term, in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,13 Justice Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor jointly
delivered an opinion for the Court upholding key sections of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. They explained that the Act's contribution
limits protected the integrity of "the electoral process '. . . through which a

free society democratically translates political speech into concrete
governmental action,"' 1 4 and that "[j]ust as troubling to a functioning
democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that
officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their
5. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics (1962).
6. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
7. Robert Frost, A Semi-Revolution, in The Poetry of Robert Frost 363, 363 (Edward
Connery Lathem ed., 1979).

8. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
10. 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005).

11. See id. at 2039.
12. See id. at 2054 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
14. Id. at 137 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000))

(Breyer, J., concurring)).
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constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large
financial contributions valued by the officeholder."' 5 By contrast, Justice
Antonin Scalia in dissent argued that the Act's restrictions undermined the
democratic process because they "prohibit[ed] the criticism of Members of
Congress by those entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice:
national political parties and corporations, both of the commercial and the
not-for-profit sort" and further entrenched incumbents. 16 Cases like
Clingman, McConnell, and Vieth v. Jubelirer17 almost inevitably force the
Justices to choose between the litigants' competing visions of what makes
democracy work.
To say that there are competing visions is not necessarily to say that
individual Justices themselves invariably hew to a particular one. My
longtime coauthor Rick Pildes has perceptively argued that the Justices of
the later Rehnquist Court could be divided into two camps based on their
"images of democracy."' 18 On one side were Justices who thought
"democracy requires order, stability, and channeled, constrained forms of
engagement"' 9-the five Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority plus,
sometimes, Justice Stephen Breyer. On the other side were Justices who
thought democracy "requires and even celebrates relatively wide-open
competition that may appear tumultuous, partisan, or worse." 20 The
exemplar of this latter camp, Professor Pildes suggested, was Justice
Stevens.
In the years since Bush v. Gore, however, the picture has grown
somewhat more complicated.
Consider, for example, the lineup in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. 2 1 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia joined by the other members of the Bush v. Gore majority,
struck down on First Amendment grounds a Minnesota canon of judicial
conduct prohibiting candidates for judicial office from announcing their
views on disputed legal issues. Once a state decides to elect its judges, the
Court held, it cannot "prevent[] candidates from discussing what the
elections are about. '22 Thus, "[i]f the State chooses to tap the energy and
23
the legitimizing power of the democratic process" for selecting judges, it
must accept the robust and sometimes strident discussion of issues in which
candidates for office often engage. By contrast, Justice Stevens, joined by
the other three Bush v. Gore dissenters, would have upheld the "channeled,
15. Id. at 153.
16. Id.at 248 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
17. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (involving the question whether the Constitution constrains
partisan gerrymandering); see also infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (discussing
Vieth).
18. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, in The Vote:

Bush, Gore, and the

Supreme Court 140, 148 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
19. Id. at 160.
20. Id.
21. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
22. Id.at 788.
23. Id. (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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constrained forms of engagement" created by the Minnesota canon because
he saw judicial elections as a distinct arena in which "electioneering" could
"compromise"
the
"judicial
reputation
for
impartiality
and
24
openmindedness."
Or consider redistricting. The political gerrymandering cases essentially
pit partisanship and competition against one another, at least when it comes
to elections themselves. Unless redistricting is channeled and constrained,
political competition is unlikely to be wide open, at least within individual
districts. 25 In Vieth,2 6 four Justices-Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Clarence Thomas-took an entirely handsoff position, viewing constitutional challenges to political gerrymanders as
nonjusticiable. 27 Four other Justices-Justices Stevens, David Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Breyer-offered three separate standards for
adjudicating such cases and concluded that the plaintiffs challenging
28
Pennsylvania's Republican-controlled gerrymander had stated a claim.
Finally, Justice Anthony Kennedy, in an example of what Justice Scalia
elsewhere colorfully described as "Never Say Never Jurisprudence," 29 left
open the possibility that a justiciable standard for adjudicating such cases
would someday emerge, but refused to entertain such challenges until it
did. 30 Thus, the recent cases make it impossible to align the Justices along
an interventionist/anti-interventionist axis and suggest that each of the
Justices sometimes prefers tumultuous politics to constrained forms of
engagement ... and sometimes does not.

One reason it may be hard to capture the Justices' visions along a single
axis may be the fact that the political process itself involves multiple
occasions for legal regulation and judicial review. I have argued elsewhere
that the right to vote actually embodies a constellation of concepts:
participation, aggregation, and governance. 3 1 With respect to participation,
a key legal question concerns who is entitled to cast a ballot and have it
counted. 32 With respect to aggregation, a great deal of contemporary
24. Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where To Draw the Line?: Judiial
Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 557-74 (2004) (discussing the
prevalence of gerrymanders that create noncompetitive districts).
26. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
27. Id. at 281 (plurality opinion).
28. For a summary of their various proposals, see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 25,
at 561-62.
29. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
30. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 309-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
Tex. L. Rev. 1705 (1993).
32. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (2000) (providing for purposes of the Voting Rights
Act, that "[t]he terms 'vote' and 'voting' shall include "all action necessary to make a vote
effective... including, but not limited to, registration,... casting a ballot, and having such
ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast"). That the right
to have one's ballot counted does not follow ineluctably from the right to receive and cast a
ballot is one of the central lessons of the litigation surrounding provisional ballots under the
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litigation concerns the sorts of electoral districts that are used and how
voters are assigned to them. And with respect to governance, cases may
turn on the extent to which rules governing the electoral process affect
whether and how a voter's policy preferences are translated into law.
Interventions at different stages of this electoral process, in service of a
variety of substantive values, may raise distinct problems. For example,
once the process is underway, the probable beneficiaries of judicial
intervention are far more identifiable, thus posing a more serious risk that
courts will be viewed as partisan actors. With the notorious exception of
Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court has generally focused on prospective,
structural questions-for example, whether particular districts or campaign
finance regimes should be used for future elections-rather than
retrospective review of particular elections. And the Court overall has been
far more willing to intervene when racial discrimination or free speech are
at stake than when other claims-such as economic or social equality-are
being advanced.
In this Essay, I suggest that one pervasive theme running through Justice
Stevens's jurisprudence is a commitment to nonpartisanship. In some
important ways, Justice Stevens's commitment to nonpartisanship is an
offshoot of a more general feature of his jurisprudence: the "one Equal
Protection Clause" perspective. 33 That perspective explains why, relative to
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as institutions, Justice Stevens was both
more open to claims of political gerrymandering and less open to claims of
racial vote dilution or gerrymandering, at least as a constitutional matter. In
the end, he has viewed all gerrymanders, regardless of the demographic
characteristics that were used to allocate voters among districts, as
essentially political, and thus properly subject to the same constraints. 34 At
the same time, Justice Stevens has also treated discrimination on the basis
of politics as subject to the same constraints regardless of the form of state
action involved. If the state cannot "base a decision to hire, promote,
transfer, recall, discharge, or retaliate against an employee, or to terminate a
contract, on the individual's partisan affiliation or speech," then it should
follow that "political affiliation is not an appropriate standard for excluding
voters from a congressional district" either. 35 For Justice Stevens, the
"concept of equal justice under law [that] requires the State to govern
ironically titled Help America Vote Act. See Edward B. Foley, The Promise and Problems
of Provisional Voting, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1193 (2005); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns
on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement,and the Help America Vote Act, 73

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1206 (2005).
33. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 749 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
generally Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins' Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27 Rutgers
L.J. 521 (1996); Note, Justice Stevens' Equal ProtectionJurisprudence, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
1146 (1987).
34. See Karlan, supra note 33.
35. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v.
City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716-17 (1996); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
674-75 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1990); Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-63 (1976)).
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impartially" 36 applies with at least the same strength to the state's decision
on how to select its officials as to what those officials do once they are in
office.
To understand this commitment to nonpartisanship, I discuss Justice
Stevens's opinions regarding the last two rounds of legislative
reapportionment. 3 7 In the 1990's round of redistricting, the central
constitutional issue before the Supreme Court was the extent to which states
could take race into account in drawing district lines. In the post-2000
round, it has been the extent to which states can take political
considerations into account. The poet Audre Lorde famously claimed that
the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house, 38 but that seems
to be precisely Justice Stevens's plan, at least with respect to using the ideas
developed in the racial redistricting cases to attack what he sees, rightly, as
the far greater threat to democratic self-government posed by the varieties
of partisan redistricting.

Prior to the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Shaw v. Reno,39 there were
two major types of voting rights injuries: disenfranchisement and dilution.
Shaw identified a new, "analytically distinct" 40 form of equal protection
claim:
[A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation,
though race-neutral on its face, cannot rationally be understood as
anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on
41
the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.
A plaintiff who established that race had played a predominant role in the
redistricting process would thereby trigger strict scrutiny of the state's plan:
Only if the plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest would it survive.
By contrast to plaintiffs in conventional voting rights cases that claimed
either disenfranchisement or dilution, plaintiffs in Shaw cases were not
required to show anything more than that they lived in the challenged

36. Id. at 317.

37. 1 do so with a certain amount of hesitation, given that the Supreme Court has
recently announced its intention to revisit the question with respect to the "reredistricting" of
Texas's congressional delegation. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.
Ct. 827 (2005) (noting probable jurisdiction over four appeals involving the Texas plan).
The cases before the Court raise the entire range of districting-related cases, from oneperson, one-vote claims, to racial and political gerrymandering challenges, to claims based
on the Voting Rights Act and the First Amendment.
38. See Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in
Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches 114-23 (1984).
39. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
40. Id. at 652.
41. Id. at 649.
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district and that race had played an impermissibly large role in the
redistricting process.
Over the remainder of the decade, the Court fleshed out the contours of a
Shaw claim. After nearly a decade's worth of confused and confusing case
law, 42 the Court announced in Easley v. Cromartie4 3 that a state's
consideration of race would not trigger strict scrutiny if partisan political
considerations played
an equally important role in the configuration of the
44
challenged districts.
But as Justice Stevens recognized early on, regardless of whether race or
partisan politics provided the best explanation for the configuration of a
challenged district, Shaw claims were less "a tool for protecting against
racial discrimination than... a means by which state residents may secondguess legislative districting in federal court for partisan ends." 45 The
inescapable partisan consequence of Shaw claims stems from the
relationship between racial identity and political affiliation. In most of the
states where Shaw challenges arose, the Democrats were in control of the
redistricting process. They faced the following quandary. On the one hand,
the Voting Rights Act and pressures within the party required the creation
of majority-nonwhite congressional or legislative districts. On the other
hand, minority voters were the party's most loyal supporters 46 and it was
virtually impossible in large parts of the South for a white Democratic
candidate to win unless his district contained substantial numbers of
minority voters. Thus, Democratic map drawers had to carefully allocate
minority voters between newly created majority-nonwhite districts and the
districts occupied by white Democratic incumbents. In several states, the
Democratic vote share was sufficiently low that the task required almost
surgical precision. 47 The upshot was that many districts had rather irregular
boundaries. The Shaw majority treated those irregular boundaries as a
product of excessive race consciousness, although they were in fact more
the product of political imperatives. 48
By contrast, pro-Republican
42. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28
(2000) (per curiam); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995). For an extensive discussion of the Shaw
cases and the legal and social science scholarship evidence surrounding them, see Samuel
Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Rick Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the
Political Process 904-45, 952-58 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
43. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
44. Id. at 241-42.
45. Shaw I1,
517 U.S. at 920 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Indeed, race was often a better predictor of which party a voter would support than
the voter's actual party registration. See Easley, 532 U.S. at 245 (explaining how
registration inaccurately predicted actual voter behavior).
47. See, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing this dynamic
with respect to the post-1990 Texas congressional redistricting).
48. This point is clearly illustrated by California's experience. California's post-1990
congressional and state legislative plans were drawn by a panel of special masters after the
legislature failed to redraw the district lines. Because the special masters "first constructed
Latino and African-American" districts and then drew the remaining majority-white districts
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gerrymanders could generally avoid creating irregularly shaped majoritynonwhite districts, since Republican plans could cheerfully waste minority
votes. Indeed, the more minority voters assigned to majority-nonwhite
districts the better: This would "bleach" the remaining districts, leaving
them relatively more Republican.
In short, Shaw litigation had an
inevitable partisan consequence
of constraining pro-Democratic
gerrymanders while leaving pro-Republican gerrymanders relatively
untouched.
In his dissent in Bush v. Vera, Justice Stevens warned that the problem
with the Court's Shaw jurisprudence was not only that it undercut efforts
"by the majority to share political power with the victims of past
discriminatory practices," 49 but that it also deflected attention from a more
serious pathology than race-consciousness: excessive partisanship.
The real problem is the politically motivated gerrymandering that
occurred in Texas. Many of the oddest twists and turns of the Texas
districts would never have been created if the legislature had not been so
intent on protecting party and incumbents....

By minimizing the critical role that political motives played in the
creation of these districts, I fear that the Court may inadvertently
encourage this more objectionable use of power in the redistricting
process. Legislatures and elected representatives have a responsibility to
behave in a way that incorporates the "elements of legitimacy and
neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the
sovereign's duty to govern impartially." That responsibility is not
discharged when legislatures permit and even encourage incumbents to
use their positions as public servants to protect themselves and their
parties rather than the interests of their constituents. If any lines in Texas
are worth straightening,
it is those that were twisted to exclude, not those
50
altered to include.
In short, for Justice Stevens, as for Professor Ely, the fact that
partisanship served as a defense to a Shaw challenge seemed perverse:
"Why, indeed, should it not be a separate (and in my opinion more serious)
51
count in the indictment?"

"around the periphery," it was the majority-white districts that "became rather elongated."
Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 579-80 (Cal. 1992); see also, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 1014-19
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the process that transformed a proposed majority-black
congressional district in Texas from its initially relatively compact shape into an irregular
one in order to protect white Democratic incumbents in adjacent districts).
49. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1038 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
50. Id. at 1039-40 (quoting City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452
(1985)).
51. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
607, 621 (1998).
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To the surprise of many, Shaw played a relatively small role in the post2000 redistricting litigation. 52 This time around, the central constitutional
issue the Court addressed was whether there were any judicially enforceable
limits on the degree of partisanship. In 2004, the Court confronted two
blatant political gerrymanders: a Republican congressional redistricting
from Pennsylvania in Vieth, 5 3 and a Democratic state legislative
54
redistricting from Georgia in Cox v. Larios.
In Vieth, a majority of the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the plaintiffs' complaint. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion would have
overruled Davis v. Bandemer 55 and declared political gerrymandering
claims non-justiciable altogether. 56 Justice Kennedy, who provided the
critical fifth vote for the Court's judgment, condemned the Pennsylvania
map, 57 floated the suggestion that "the First Amendment may offer a
sounder and more prudential basis for intervention than does the Equal
Protection Clause," 5 8 but then voted to affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
complaint because no one had yet presented him with a workable test for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims.
Justice Stevens dissented. In 1986, during the Burger Court's foray into
the tangled thicket of political gerrymandering, Justice Stevens had joined
Justice Powell in arguing that constitutional challenges should be evaluated
by considering the nature of the process that produced the challenged
districts, examining the physical configuration of the districts, and asking
whether the lines served any neutral purpose beyond curtailing a targeted
group's political strength. 59 This time around, Justice Stevens refined that
approach by arguing that the Court's Shaw jurisprudence had essentially
adopted that standard. 60 And he used the Shaw cases, which had been
joined by each of the four Justices who denied the justiciability of political
gerrymandering claims, to criticize their failure to intervene.
52. For some discussion of why this is, see Issacharoff, Karlan & Pildes, supra note 42,
at 187-88 (rev. 2d Supp. 2005); J.Morgan Kousser, Whatever Happened to Shaw v. Reno?
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
53. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
54. 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
55. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
56. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 316 ("Here, one has the sense that legislative restraint was

abandoned.").
57. Id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Id. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
59. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 165, 175-78 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part). Justice Lewis Powell, in turn, based his analysis on Justice
Stevens's earlier concurrence in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), a case in which
the Court struck down a fairly blatant partisan gerrymander of New Jersey's congressional

redistricting on one-person, one-vote grounds, but in which Justice Stevens had argued that
the plan was unconstitutional because of its political consequences. See Bandemer, 478 U.S.
at 173; see also infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's

approach).
60. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens's invocation of the Shaw cases to explain the nature of
the constitutional injury was particularly significant. "Undergirding" the
Shaw cases, he wrote, "is the premise that... gerrymanders effect a
constitutional wrong when they disrupt the representational norms that
ordinarily tether elected officials to their constituencies as a whole." 6 1 The
official elected from a gerrymandered district will attribute her victory "to
the architect of the district rather than to a constituency defined by neutral
principles." 62 If anything, this problem is worse when the district is the
product of a political gerrymander rather than a racial one, since at least in
the latter case, the message sent by the district's configuration is that the
representative is expected to champion the interests of an identifiable subset
of her constituency. In the case of a partisan gerrymander, the message is
that the representative is beholden to the party leaders who crafted 63her
district-those who drew the map rather than those who cast the ballots.
The reason this focus matters is that it transfers the attention away from
the question that seems to preoccupy the litigants-namely, the fairness of
the redistricting to the two political parties-and centers it instead on the
interests of voters. As I have explained elsewhere, the real pathology in
contemporary political gerrymandering lies not so much in the way one of
the two major political parties obtains an advantage over the other, but in
the way that the redistricting process skews the overall distribution of
districts, producing nothing but relatively safe districts, with the mapdrawing party capturing most of those districts while conceding a smaller
number to the out-party. 64
This skew has two consequences. First, because few if any of the
districts are competitive, the allocation of political power is essentially
frozen into place for a decade, regardless of shifts in voters' preferences.
As Professor Daniel Ortiz has explained,
A national swing of five percent in voter opinion-a sea change in most
elections-will change very few seats in the current House of
Representatives. Gerrymandering thus creates a kind of inertia that
arrests the House's dynamic process. It makes it less certain that votes in
the chamber will reflect shifts in popular opinion, and thus frustrates
change and creates
undemocratic slippage between the people and their
65
government.
Second, because the primary electorate in each party tends to be further
from the center than either the party's membership as a whole or the entire
electorate, representatives elected from safe seats tend to lie further from
the middle of the political spectrum. The result is a more polarized
legislative process in which the centrist representatives who often broker
compromises are absent. As Justice Stevens noted this past Term, the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
See id. at 331.
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 25, at 570-74.
Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459, 487 (2004).
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Court's "refusal to intervene in political gerrymandering cases," means that
"an increasing number of districts are becoming 'safe districts' in which
one party effectively controls the outcome of the election. '66 In Justice
Stevens's view, as in mine, the trend toward entirely safe districting, which
both freezes into place the existing allocation of power and relieves
representatives of the need to appeal to the median voter of even their
distorted districts "can only increase the bitter partisanship that has already
poisoned some of those bodies that once provided
inspiring examples of
'6 7
courteous adversary debate and deliberation.
In his most recent opinion, a concurrence in the little-remarked summary
disposition of Cox, 68 Justice Stevens gave yet another illustration of how he
deploys a wide variety of doctrinal tools in pursuit of the nonpartisan. Cox
concerned the post-2000 Georgia state legislative reapportionment. 69 The
Democrats were in control of the process, and although the state's
population had become increasingly Republican and suburban, the
Democrats sought, by creative line drawing and exploitation of the socalled ten-percent safe harbor, 70 to preserve Democratic control of the
legislature. 7 1 A three-judge district court struck down the plan, not because
it represented an impermissible political gerrymander, but because the
population deviations among the districts-although they remained below
72
ten percent-could not be justified with reference to any neutral factors.
The Supreme Court affirmed in a one-sentence per curiam opinion. Of
the four Justices who earlier that Term in Vieth had argued that political
gerrymanders were nonjusticiable, only Justice Scalia dissented, arguing
73
that the case should be set for plenary consideration.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a brief concurring
opinion. After reviewing and condemning the variety of techniques the
district creators had employed to protect Democratic incumbents while
simultaneously undermining Republicans' seats, the Justice noted that
"[a]fter our recent decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the equal-population

66. Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S.Ct. 2029, 2049 n.2 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2054.
68. 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
69. The background to the case is discussed more extensively in Issacharoff & Karlan,
supra note 25, at 564-69.
70. In Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983), the Court stated that, with respect
to state and local redistricting (as opposed to congressional redistricting); "[o]ur decisions
have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum
population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations" that do not
constitute a prima facie case of malapportionment. See Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One
Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting, 7 U. Pa. J.Const. L. 1001, 1012 (2005)
(discussing the evolution of the ten-percent rule).
71. Or so they thought. See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the
Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 Election L.J. 21, 29 (2004) (discussing how several
Democratic incumbents switched parties after the 2002 election thereby giving Republicans
control over the state senate).
72. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1347, 1357-58 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
73. See Cox, 542 U.S. at 951-52 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting practices,
74
and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.
In some ways, Justice Stevens's concurrence in Cox serves as a bookend
to his concurrence in Karcher v. Daggett,75 the case in which the Supreme
Court rejected the idea of any safe harbor, for population deviations in
congressional redistricting. There, the Supreme Court had struck down a
Democratic gerrymander of New Jersey's congressional seats in which the
population deviation between the largest and smallest districts was less than
one percent, 76 a difference entirely dwarfed by the statistical imprecision of
the census itself. The Court rejected the argument that such essentially
notional deviations were de minimis, holding that the state bore the burden
of proving that any avoidable deviation from census-based equipopulosity,
'77
however small, was "necessary to achieve some legitimate goal."
Justice Stevens provided the decisive fifth vote for the Court's holding.
But his concurrence made clear that the partisan nature of the process and
the map it produced were crucial to his analysis. 7 8 In contrast to the Court,
which relied on Article I, Section 2, for the source of the one-person, onevote requirement in congressional elections, 79 Justice Stevens would have
located the requirement within the Equal Protection Clause.80 And for him,
the central value of the Equal Protection Clause was nonpartisanship:
The Equal Protection Clause requires every State to govern
impartially. When a State adopts rules governing its election machinery
or defining electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the interests of the
entire community. If they serve no purpose other than to favor one
segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that
may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to
disadvantage a politically weak segment of the8 1community, they violate
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Thus, Justice Stevens was "convinced that judicial preoccupation with
the goal of perfect population equality is an inadequate method of judging
the constitutionality of an apportionment plan."8 2 The reason he found no
"virtue" in relaxing the one-person, one-vote requirement was because
"'[l]ogic, as well as experience, tells us... that there can be no total
sanctuaries in the political thicket, else unfairness will simply shift from

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 949-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
462 U.S. 725 (1983).
See id. at 728.
Id.at731.

78. See id. at 744, 761-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. See id.at 730; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (holding that
"construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be
chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's").
concurring).
80. See Karcher,462 U.S. at 747 (Stevens, J.,
81. Id.at 748 (citation omitted).
82. Id.at 750.
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one form to another." 83 One-person, one-vote might be an incomplete tool
for attacking partisan gerrymanders, but as long as it was the only tool that
achieved a consensus. within the Court, Justice Stevens was prepared to
invoke it even when he recognized its artificiality.
To some extent, Justice Stevens has had the unfortunate luxury in the
political gerrymandering cases of being in dissent. Thus, in Vieth he was
not required to articulate remedial principles for courts to employ in curing
constitutional violations. Indeed, just as Justice Stevens employed the
Shaw cases to argue that there are judicially manageable standards for
deciding when a political gerrymander has crossed the constitutional line by
subordinating traditional neutral principles to pure partisanship, one might
deploy Justice Stevens's dissents in the Shaw cases to critique their
extension to claims of unconstitutional partisan consciousness. As the
Justice himself recognizes, partisanship has always played a role in
districting decisions; their political consequences are never entirely
accidental. Thus, determining when partisanship crosses the line cannot, I
think, be answered by reference to purely objective factors. The reliance on
objective factors-be they measures of compactness, seat/vote ratios, or
factual accounts of the process by which a challenged plan was enactedwill never substitute for the reality that, in the end, judges must exercise
judgment. And that judgment will inevitably be colored by their view of
what democracy requires.

83. Id.at 751 (quoting Robert Dixon, The Court, the People, and "One Man, One Vote,"
in Reapportionment in the 1970s 32, 32 (Nelson Polsby ed., 1971)).
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